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JUSTICE SCALIA AND FOURTH ESTATE
SKEPTICISM
RonNell Andersen Jones*
INTRODUCTION
When news broke of the death of Justice Antonin Scalia,
some aspects of the Justice's legacy were instantly apparent. It
was immediately clear that he would be remembered for his
advocacy of constitutional originalism, his ardent opposition to
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and his
authorship of the watershed Second Amendment case of the
modern era.1
Yet there are other, less obvious but equally significant
ways that Justice Scalia made his own unique mark and left
behind a Court that was fundamentally different than the one he
had joined thirty years earlier. Among them is the way he
impacted the relationship between the Court and the press.
When Scalia was confirmed as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1986, he joined a Court that had spent the previous two
decades actively characterizing the press as an invaluable
"Fourth Estate." 2 The Court had repeatedly and glowingly
depicted a free press as an essential component of democracy-
an accountability-enhancing watchdog,3 a shaper of community
* Lee E. Teitelbaum Endowed Chair and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law.
'Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-
death.html? r=0.
2 For greater discussion of this trend and additional examples, see RonNell Andersen
Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks ofthe Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REv.
253 (2014), [hereinafter Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks].
3See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (asserting that "the basic assumption of our political system [is] that
the press will often serve as an important restraint on government"); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (the press "does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (calling the press "the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration" and saying that its "record of service over several centuries" has been
"impressive"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (noting that "the press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by
governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve").
dialogue,' a trusted public educator,' and a valuable proxy for
the citizen in observing government affairs.' Thirty years later,
that model of the press as a positively contributing social entity
worthy of protection appears to be greatly diminished.' The old
model has been replaced with Court depictions of the press as a
profit-driven institution prone to error, guilty of distorting the
political process and oversimplifying or ignoring issues, and
unworthy of special constitutional consideration.'
This essay explores the frequency, tenor, and
consequences of Justice Scalia's characterizations of the press,
examining the Justice's personal and jurisprudential relationship
with the media. It focuses on the ways in which Scalia signaled,
both on and off the bench, his distrust of the institutional press
and his wholesale rejection of any Fourth Estate specialness. It
observes that this powerful brand of Fourth Estate skepticism not
only dominated Justice Scalia's media-law jurisprudence-in
which he repeatedly and adamantly insisted that the press is no
different than any other speaker-but also permeated his
writings on other topics, from election law and separation of
powers to court cameras and recusals, and helped shepherd the
Court into an era of profound cynicism about the media and its
role in American society.
Justice Scalia was by no means alone in his personal
misgivings about the press,' nor was he alone in expressing less-
4 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (emphasizing the
importance ofthe exercise of newspapers' editorial judgment); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 539 (1965) (describing the press as "a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest
in governmental affairs").
5 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (asserting that " [an untrammeled press [is] a vital source
of public information"); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980)
(noting the press is central to "public understanding of the rule of law and to
comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system").
6 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) ("[I]n a society in which
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand
the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him
in convenient form the facts of those operations ... Without the information provided
by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.").
Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 261-62.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
See generally RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE MEDIA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
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than-positive characterizations of the media in Court opinions."o
Moreover, the media itself-and society's relationship with,
reliance upon, and trust in the institutional press-changed
radically in this critical time period that Justice Scalia occupied
the bench." This suggests that there are many more factors at
play in the shift in press characterizations than the insistent views
of one jurist. But a close look at the linguistic and attitudinal
movement by the Court on the question of press characterization
shows Justice Scalia pulling the laboring oar in many ways-
moving the typical depiction away from a more positive view of
the institutional press and toward a more denigrating one. This
change, which Justice Scalia urged and contributed to both on
and off the bench, may matter well beyond its ramifications for
the press itself, and it may place the Court and the nation at an
important turning point as Justice Scalia's replacement is named.
I. FOURTH ESTATE SKEPTICISM IN JUSTICE SCALIA'S
PERSONAL INTERACTIONS WITH THE PRESS
Justice Scalia's characterizations of the media were
complicated by the fact that he was not only a jurist who
considered the question of press rights in his judicial opinions,
but also a public figure who was himself the subject of press
coverage. His personal interactions with the press were marked
by agitation and tension for nearly all of the Justice's time on the
Court.
Reporters who covered the Justice's appearances
described his attitude toward working journalists as "churlish"1 2
and "prickly" " and suggested that their exchanges were
punctuated with "animosity."1 4 Scalia "did not make it easy for
journalists to cover his appearances," almost never allowing
1o See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text (discussing Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (majority opinion by Justice Kennedy)).
" See Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 264 (discussing changes in
the technology by which news is delivered and the quality with which news is delivered
that might have had an impact on the ways the Court depicts the press).
12 Associated Press, AP Photog Angers Scalia, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (Oct. 21, 2004),
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/news/ap-photog-angers-scalia/.
13 Id.
14 Gina Holland, Associated Press, Scalia Turns Journalists Away From Speech, EDITOR
& PUBLISHER (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.editorandpublisher.com/news/scalia-
turns-journalists-away-from-speech/.
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these appearances to be broadcast, and for many years forbidding
them from being recorded "even by print reporters seeking to
ensure the accuracy of their notes." " Over the course of his
tenure on the Court, the Justice regularly made headlines when
various reporters seeking to cover his remarks were turned away
from public speeches or otherwise impeded in their work.1 In
2003, he faced particularly sharp criticism for banning
broadcasters from an event at which he received an award for
supporting free speech.17 The Justice gave remarks after being
given a recognition called the "Citadel of Free Speech Award"
at The City Club in Cleveland, Ohio." The club traditionally
taped its speakers for subsequent broadcast on public television,1 9
but Scalia insisted on barring all television and radio coverage as
a condition for accepting-a position media organizations
criticized as hypocritical.20
The following year, Justice Scalia's tussles with the press
made headlines again, when reporters from the Associated Press
and a local newspaper were ordered by U.S. Marshals to erase
their audiotape recordings of comments the Justice had made
15 Liptak, supra note 1. The Justice's policy evolved to allow recordings by print
journalists, but he continued to impose very strict limitations on coverage of his
remarks. See Biden, Clinton, Kagan, and Scalia Join Leaders from Government, Business,
and Law at Conference Marking LSC's 407h Anniversary, LEGAL SERV. CORP. (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.1sc.gov/media-center/press-releases/2014/biden-clinton-kagan-
and-scalia-join-leaders-government-business-and ("U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia delivered remarks during an afternoon luncheon. Justice Scalia's
media guidelines allowed only still camera and/or pencil-and-pad coverage during
the speech. Photos were [to] be limited to the first and last 1-2 minutes of the event.
Recording devices were permitted for note-taking purposes and not for broadcast.").
16 See James Vicini, Justice Scalia Defends Bush v. Gore Ruling, REUTERS (April 24,
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-scalia-
idUSN2443345820080424 (describing a 2004 event in which Justice Scalia's
"security detail forced two reporters in Mississippi to erase tape recordings of a
speech he gave"); Gina Holland, supra note 14 (describing how an Associated Press
reporter was turned away from a speech to the American Council of Life Insurers,
"which was said to be a mistake as the event was not supposed to be closed to print
press"); Paul Singer, Associated Press, Justice Bars Media from Free-Speech Event,
TOPEKA-CAPITAL J. (March 20, 2003),
http://cjonline.com/stories/032003/usw freespeech.shtml#.WAoxizsdDww
(describing Justice Scalia's insistence that television and radio coverage be banned
when he received a free speech award) [hereinafter Justice Bars Media from Free-speech
Event].
17 Justice Bars Media from Free-Speech Event, supra note 16.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. (quoting the president of the Radio-Television News Directors as saying "[t]he
irony of excluding journalists from an event designed to celebrate the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech is obvious to all").
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during an event at a high school in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.2 1
The event was open to the press, but the Justice had insisted that
it not be recorded, and the Marshal who required the tapes to be
erased had cited this policy in doing so. 22 The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press wrote Justice Scalia a letter
expressing disappointment in the action and encouraging the
Justice to change his policy of forbidding recording. Scalia later
apologized,2 3 saying that neither the event security nor the U.S.
Marshals work at the Justices' direction, but that he would
express a preference that they not confiscate recordings. He
agreed to reconsider his policy and begin allowing recording for
the use by print media, but held firm on his ban on broadcasting
any of his remarks. "The electronic media have in the past
respected my First Amendment right not to speak on radio or
television when I do not wish to do so," he said, "and I am sure
that courtesy will continue." 24
On some occasions, though, Justice Scalia's run-ins with
reporters were angry and hostile. Once, during a meeting of the
National Italian American Foundation, he brusquely snapped
"that's enough" at a newspaper photographer who was shooting
pictures of another panelist. When the photographer moved to
the back of the room and began using a telephoto lens, Scalia
"pointed out the photographer to the panel moderator and
vigorously gestured for him to stop. Another photographer
ventured to the front to take pictures, but scurried away in the
face of angry looks from Scalia-dropping some of his camera
21 See Vicini, Justice Scalia Defends Bush v. Gore Ruling, supra note 16.
22 Id.
23 See Gene Policinski, Justice Scalia: The 45 Words - and Original Meaning - ofthe First
Amendment, NEWSEUM INST. (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2016/02/16/justice-scalia-the-45-words-and-
original-meaning-of-the-first-amendment/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) (quoting the
letter to the reporter as saying "I abhor as much as any American the prospect of a
law enforcement officer's seizing a reporter's notes or recording. The marshals were
doing what they believed to be their job, and the fault was mine in not assuring that
the ground rules had been clarified . . .. I have learned my lesson (at your expense),
and shall certainly be more careful in the future. Indeed, in the future I will make it
clear that recording for use of the print media is no problem at all."); Liptak, supra
note 1 (describing Scalia's apology to Antoinette Konz of the Hattiesburg American).
24 Liptak, supra note 1; REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Six
degrees of Antonin Scalia, 40 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW (Winter 2016),
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-
and-law-winter-2016/six-degrees-antonin-scalia.
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equipment, which he left behind."2 5 A few years later, as Justice
Scalia exited Red Mass in Boston, he was approached by a
reporter who asked whether Scalia had taken "a lot of flak for
publicly celebrating" his religious beliefs,26 and who suggested
that parties before the Court "might question his impartiality in
church-state matters." 2 7 Justice Scalia responded with a chin
flick that the journalist reported to be an obscene gesture,
sparking a firestorm of commentary about the interaction. 28
Scalia ultimately wrote a letter to the Boston Herald, rebuking
the reporter as having watched too many episodes of The
Sopranos and insisting that the gesture was not vulgar, but simply
meant "I couldn't care less. It's no business of yours. Count me
out."29
Other journalists also found themselves the subjects of
Scalia's vitriol and personal ire. In the fall of 2000, the Justice
lashed out at Legal Times Supreme Court reporter, Tony Mauro,
in a letter to the editor to the publication, in which he
sarcastically used Mauro's surname as a derogatory adjective:
"Mauronic."" Mauro and another journalist had published an
article focused on a proposal to lift a ban on federal judges
receiving speaking fees.3 1 The article had suggested that Justice
Scalia might be a major instigator of the push for these increased
honoraria, quoting an unnamed judge as saying that "Scalia's the
25 Associated Press, AP Photog Angers Scalia, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (Oct. 21, 2004),
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/news/ap-photog-angers-scalia/.
26 Peter Lattman, Scalia's Gesture: Obscene or Not?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (March 31,
2006 2:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/1aw/2006/03/31/justice-scalias-gesture-
obscene-or-not-obscene/.27 Vicini, Justice Scalia Defends Bush v. Gore Ruling, supra note 16.
28 See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 26; NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Day to Day: Justice
Scalia's Under-the-Chin Gesture (March 30, 2006, 1:00 PM) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5312065); Dahlia Lithwick,
How Do You Solve the Problem of Scalia?, SLATE (March 30, 2006),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2006/03/how do
you solve the-problem of scalia.html; Hillary Profita, The Gesture in Question, CBS
NEWS (March 29, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-gesture-in-question/;
Gina Pace, Justice Scalia Gives Obscene Gesture?, CBS NEWS (March 27, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-gives-obscene-gesture/.
29 Scalia Letter to the Editor, Boston Herald, PBS (Dec. 2006),
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources-documentl6.html;
see also Liptak, supra note 1.
30 Tony Mauro, When Justice Scalia Turned My Name into an Adjective, NAT'L L. J.
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id= 1202750517722/When-
Scalia-Turned-My-Name-Into-an-Adjective?slreturn=20160920173517.
31 Id.
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only one who talks about" the idea and asserting that "[o]n
Capitol Hill, it became known as the 'Keep Scalia on the Court'
bill," because the ban "was one of several factors that caused
[Scalia] to muse aloud from time to time about leaving the
court."32
Justice Scalia's response letter-a rare public statement
by a sitting Justice-acknowledged that he had responded
positively to inquiries about the proposal and believed it to be a
"good idea," but castigated the reporters for falsely suggesting
that he was driven purely by financial gain and for engaging in
what he called "a mean-spirited attack on my personal
integrity."3 3 He wrote that "[o]nly someone intent on writing a
slanted story" would make such assertions, and said that the
article was "gossipy, titillating (and thus characteristically
Mauronic)."34
For most of his years on the bench, Justice Scalia insisted
that interactions between the press and sitting Justices were
inappropriate." He deviated from this position in 2008, when
commentators noticed something of a "turnabout" as the "justice
who once shunned the media" engaged in a "media blitz" while
promoting a book he had written." Outside this relatively brief
period, however, Scalia's personal relationship with the press
was at best strained, and at worst, deeply confrontational, with
his skepticism of the Fourth Estate role both implicit in his
behaviors and explicit in his commentary.
II. FOURTH ESTATE SKEPTICISM OUTSIDE OF MEDIA CASES
These more public demonstrations of disdain for the press
were only the tip of the iceberg for the Justice. More than any of
his peers, Justice Scalia went out of his way to negatively
32 Id.; Justice Scalia Tears into Newspaper, Denies his Needs Led Him to Back Pay Hike, SF
GATE (Oct. 3, 2000), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Justice-Scalia-Tears-
Into-Newspaper-Denies-His-2703193.php; Anne Gearan, Justice Scalia Complains of
'Attack', WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/aponline/20001002/aponlinel40643_000.htm.
33 Gearan, supra note 32.
34Justice Scalia Tears into Newspaper, supra note 32.
35 Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia (CSPAN television broadcast July 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia], http://www.c-span.org/video/?307035-
1/justice-antonin-scalia-19362016.
36 Vicini, Justice Scalia Defends Bush v. Gore Ruling, supra note 16.
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characterize the press in judicial opinions where the press was
not a party and where press freedoms were not squarely at issue.
Likewise, in orders that he issued, in commentary during oral
argument, and in interviews, speeches, and congressional
hearings on various Court matters, Justice Scalia depicted the
press as problematic, harmful, intrusive, gossip-seeking,
confused, and above all, not worthy of any special protection-
views that made their way into the Justice's opinions in press
cases and ultimately influenced the characterization embraced
by the Court's majority.
A. Skepticism in Commentary from the Bench
Scalia was prone to bringing up the press when other
matters were being debated, and when he did so, his negative
views were apparent. For example, in the oral argument for the
case of Garett v. Ceballos,37 a case focused on the scope of First
Amendment free speech protections for government employees,
Justice Scalia drew attention for turning the line of questioning
to the behaviors of the press," casting the media as focused on
"gossip" 39 and "scurrilous" 40 rumors. He sarcastically doubted
aloud whether the press's judgment about the newsworthiness of
a matter was a proper mechanism for determining matters of
public concern or legitimate news interests. 41 Although the
Court's previous commentary on the Fourth Estate had insisted
upon great deference to determinations of editorial judgment by
the working press and had repeatedly praised the press for its role
in identifying matters of public concern and educating the
37 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
38 Gina Holland, supra note 14 (Scalia "talked about gossip-seeking reporters during a
court argument about free-speech rights.").
3' Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No.
04-473) ("[Hlis boss's wife, a mayor of a big city, is running around with somebody.
Okay? And that's picked up by the press. It's there on the gossip pages. She's a public
figure. You say that would be covered by this... Anything that would get in the press.
That's it.... Wow.").
40 Id. at 49.
41 Id. at 48-49 (discussing "legitimate news interest": "[S]o if an employee ... comes
forward with some scurrilous information about a family member of his boss, who is
a public figure, and his whole families are public figures, which would be picked up
by the press, that would be a matter of public concern? . . . Gee, I never understood
that that's what the test was").
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citizenry about those matters, 42 Justice Scalia's tone and
substance presupposed the opposite.
The Justice asserted a similarly critical characterization of
the press in his 2004 memorandum describing why he would not
be recusing himself from a case in which Vice President Dick
Cheney was a named party.4 3 Calls for Scalia's recusal had
emerged when it came to light that while the case was pending
before the Supreme Court, Scalia and Cheney had gone duck
hunting together in Louisiana, with Cheney providing
transportation on his plane for Scalia and members of his
family.44 Justice Scalia's memorandum detailed his reasoning for
why recusal was not required under relevant precedent, 45 but also
described a litany of sins that the Justice believed the media had
committed. Although Scalia expressed concern about what he
perceived as irresponsible factual errors committed by the press
in reporting on the particular issue, 46 he also set forth a
significantly more skeptical overarching view of the press than
the Court had embraced in the immediately preceding years.4 7
While the Court that Justice Scalia joined had consistently
lauded the value of the press as a check on government,4 8 Scalia's
Cheney memorandum issued a rather blistering rebuke against
42 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (calling the
press the "chieft]" source of public information); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539
(1965) (praising the press for "informing the citizenry of public events and
occurrences"); Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (noting that
"[t]he newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say,
have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the
nation than any other instrumentality . . . ").
43 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 923, 927-28 (2004).
4 4 d.
45 Id. at 921, 926 (arguing that a mere friendship with a government official who was a
named party did not warrant recusal and that the flight on the jet was not a gift of any
value).
461 Id. at 928.
47 See id.
48 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585 (1983) (asserting that "the basic assumption of our political system [is] that the
press will often serve as an important restraint on government"); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976) (the press "does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (calling the press "the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration" and saying that its "record of service over several centuries" has been
"impressive"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (noting that "the press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by
governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve").
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what he saw as "inappropriate" and potentially "silly," "so-
called investigative journalists,"4 9 who assert too bold a role in
calling for recusals" and who had produced a "blast of largely
inaccurate and uninformed opinion.""1 He sweepingly argued
that "constant baseless allegations of impropriety" are "the
staple of Washington reportage" 52 and described newspapers
that had covered him as misinformed, misleading, and
miseducated. " "It is well established," he wrote, "that the
recusal inquiry must be 'made from the perspective of a reasonable
observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances,"' and the press, he said, should not be considered
such an observer.54 To the contrary, he said, the media is "eager
to find foot-faults""-a criticism that stands in stark contrast to
the repeated statements from the Court, in the time before Scalia
joined it, that the willingness of the press to act as a watchdog
was one of its most praiseworthy traits " and that it needed
4 Cheney, 541 U.S. at 927 ("My recusal would also encourage so-called investigative
journalists to suggest improprieties, and demand recusals, for other inappropriate (and
increasingly silly) reasons.").
5o Id. ("[R]ecusing in the face of such charges would give elements of the press a veto
over participation of any Justices who had social contacts with, or were even known
to be friends of, a named official. That is intolerable.").
51 Id. at 924.
5 2 d at 928.
5 Id. at 924 ("And these are just the inaccuracies pertaining to the facts. With regard to
the law, the vast majority of the editorials display no recognition of the central
proposition that a federal officer is not ordinarily regarded to be a personal party in
interest in an official-action suit. And those that do display such recognition facilely
assume, contrary to all precedent, that in such suits mere political damage (which they
characterize as a destruction of Cheney's reputation and integrity) is ground for
recusal.").54
1d.
5 Id. at 928 ("The people must have confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and that
cannot exist in a system that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship
or favor, and in an atmosphere where the press will be eager to find foot-faults.").
51 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (noting "the basic assumption of our political system that the press
will often serve as an important restraint on government"); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (noting that "the role of the media is important," commenting
that "they can be a powerful and constructive force, contributing to remedial action
in the conduct of public business" and indicating that "[t]hey have served that
function since the beginning of the Republic"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-
19 (1966) (stating that "[t]he Constitution specifically selected the press ... to play
an important role in the discussion of public affairs," that "[t]he press serves and was
designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials," and that "the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents
and to clamor and contend for or against change" is a matter that "the Framers of
our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and
keep it free"); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (noting the "free press has
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"breathing space" to perform this task. 5 Justice Scalia's
memorandum balked at the suggestion that "[he] must recuse
because a significant portion of the press, which is deemed to be
the American public, demands it." " Yet, during the Fourth
Estate era, the Court had repeatedly suggested that the press did,
in fact, echo the will of, and act on behalf of, the American
public. It had explicitly noted that among the valuable roles
played by the press is its capacity to reflect upon on and shape
conversations for the American public.59 Justice Scalia's counter-
narrative rejected this Fourth Estate quality. The memorandum,
like other writings from Scalia, offered a derogatory subtext
about the American media and what the Justice perceived as its
diminished place in the democracy.
B. Skepticism in Off-the-Bench Commentary
This same pattern of Fourth Estate skepticism permeated
many of Justice Scalia's comments off the bench, with the Justice
going out of his way to negatively depict the press even when it
was not the primary topic at hand. He faulted it for public
misinformation and used comments about the unpraiseworthy
behaviors of the press as illustrative negative examples when he
had other, wider points to make.
One of the most notable examples of this is seen in Justice
Scalia's tendency to disapprovingly reference the landmark press
case of New York Times v. Sullivan. 60 In panel discussions,
interviews, and congressional hearings, the Justice regularly was
asked for his views on separation of powers and the role of the
judiciary in constitutional interpretation. Those views, for which
Justice Scalia became well known during his time on the Court,
centered on a concern about judicial overreach and an
been a mighty catalyst in . .. exposing corruption among public officers and
employees").
" N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
5 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004).
5 SeeMiami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (emphasizingthe
importance of the exercise of newspapers' editorial judgment); Estes, 381 U.S. at 539
(describing the press as "a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs"); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936) ("A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government
and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.").
60 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
268
20171 FOURTH ESTATE SKEPTSIM 269
opposition to the notion of a "living constitution."6 1 But of all the
examples of perceived judicial activism and departures from
constitutional originalism that Justice Scalia could have drawn
upon to demonstrate his uneasiness, he most regularly used the
illustration of Sullivan, 62 a case that focused on the press's
reporting on the civil rights movement. The case established a
heightened standard that must be met by public officials who
accuse the press of libel on matters related to their official
duties,6 3 and it was in many ways a centerpiece of the Fourth
Estate jurisprudence of the pre-Scalia court. In his off-the-bench
commentary, Justice Scalia acerbically condemned the decision
as "a marvelous example of the living Constitution,"64 in which
the Court "simply [decided to] give the First Amendment a
meaning that nobody, nobody ever ratified." 65 His fuller
comments on the issue almost always accentuated his
originalism by highlighting that Thomas Jefferson or George
Washington "would have been appalled at the notion that they
could be libeled with impunity""6 and by insinuating that Sullivan
6 Considering the Role ofJudges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 36-38 (2011) [hereinafter Judicial Hearings]
(statement of J. Antonin Scalia) available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12shrg7099 1/pdf/CHRG-
112shrg70991.pdf.
62 See The Kalb Report: Justices Scalia and Ginsburg on the First Amendment and Freedom
(CSPAN television broadcast Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Kalb Report], http://www.c-
span.org/video/?3 18884-1 /conversation-justices-scalia-ginsburg-20 14; Don Franzen,
Reading the Text: An Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia ofthe US. Supreme Court, L.A.
REV. OF BooKs (Oct. 1, 2012), https://1areviewofbooks.org/interview/reading-the-
text-an-interview-with-justice-antonin-scalia-of-the-u-s-supreme-court; Judicial
Hearings, supra note 61; Washington Ideas Forum, Day 2, Morning Session (CSPAN
television broadcast Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.c-span.org/video/?301921-
16/washington-ideas-forum-day-2-morning-session.
63 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
64 Judicial Hearings, supra note 61.
65 Franzen, supra note 62 ("An example of how you could distort the First
Amendment is New York Times vs. Sullivan. I mean, at the time the First Amendment
was adopted, libel was not a permissible form of speech. You could be liable for
slandering someone. The Warren Court just decided, well, it'd be better if the press
could criticize political figures with impunity, so long as they had some reasonable
basis.").
66 Kalb Report, supra note 62 ("So long as he heard from somebody, you know, it
makes it very difficult for a public figure to win a libel suit. I think George
Washington, I think Thomas Jefferson, I think the framers would have been appalled
at the notion that they could be libeled with impunity. And, when the Supreme
Court came out with that decision, it was revising the Constitution. Now, it may be a
very good idea to set up a system that way. And New York State could have revised
its libel laws by popular vote to say, if you libel a public figure, it's okay unless it's
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gave the press an unwarranted windfall to be able to act
irresponsibly without consequence:
[Y]ou can libel public figures without liability so
long as you are relying on some statement from a
reliable source, whether it's true or not. Now the
old libel law used to be you're responsible, you say
something false that harms somebody's
reputation, we don't care if it was told to you by
nine bishops, you are liable. New York Times v.
Sullivan just cast that aside because the Court
thought in modem society, it'd be a good idea if
the press could say a lot of stuff about public
figures without having to worry. Now, and that
may be correct, that may be right, but if it was right
it should have been adopted by the people. It
should have been debated in the New York
Legislature and the New York Legislature could
have said, 'Yes, we're going to change our libel
law.' But the living constitutionalists on the
Supreme Court, the Warren Court, simply
decided, 'Oh, yes, it used to be that . . . George
Washington could sue somebody that libeled him,
but we don't think that's a good idea anymore.'67
Justice Scalia made clear that he thought Sullivan
"distort[ed] the First Amendment"" and that it represented a
shift in law by judicial fiat, a practice of which he strongly
disapproved. But his repeated narrative on this point-that the
Court "just decided it would be a good idea if there were no such
thing as libeling a public figure so long as you have good reason
to believe the lie you tell about him"6 9 -was as critical of the
press as it was of the Court, and was an additional manifestation
of his Fourth Estate skepticism.
malicious. But New York State didn't do that. It was nine lawyers who decided that
that's what the Constitution ought to mean, even though it had never meant that.").
6 Washington Ideas Forum, Day 2, Morning Session (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct.
6, 2011), http://www.c-span.org/video/?301921-16/washington-ideas-forum-day-2-
morning-session.
68 Franzen, supra note 62.
69 Judicial Hearings, supra note 61, at 38.
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Likewise, on the recurring question of cameras in the
U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was heavily focused on his
distrust of the media. To be sure, he was not the only Justice who
was against the idea. Many justices have testified before
Congress and spoken publicly over the years in opposition to
broadcast coverage of the Court's oral arguments7 0-and even
those who have initially expressed support for cameras have
changed their minds and spoken against them.7 1 But Justice
Scalia's responses to inquiries about the possibility are unique
among his colleagues for their strong Fourth Estate skepticism.
His colleagues' resistance to cameras has often focused on the
Court and its Justices. Justice Thomas, for example, has
emphasized his security concerns.72 Justices Kennedy and Breyer
have usually discussed their fears that cameras would present a
disruption to the traditional decorum of the Court's
proceedings.7 3 Justice Scalia's focus, in contrast, was often on the
press, and his total surety that broadcast journalists covering oral
argument would not use the footage in any responsible or helpful
way.7 4 In his remarks on the subject, he regularly suggested that
7o See RonNell Andersen Jones, US. Supreme Court Justices and Press Access, 2012 BYU
L. REv. 1791, 1812 (2012).
71 Id.; see also Matt Sedensky & Sam Hananel, Supreme Court's Kagan, Sotomayor
Rethink Support for Cameras in the Courtroom, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts law/supreme-courts-kagan-
sotomayor-rethink-support-for-cameras-in-the-courtroom/2015/02/02/lfb9c44c-
ab34-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html?utm term=.e542d340bb9f.
72 Fiscal Year 2007 Supreme Court Budget (C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 4, 2006),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?191906-1/fiscal-year-2007-supreme-court-
budget&start= 1158 (statement of Clarence Thomas, Assoc. J. of the United States
Supreme Court) ("[Cameras] will raise additional security concerns as the other
members of the Court who now have some degree of anonymity, lose that
anonymity. I probably have more of a public recognition than any of the current
members of the Court, and that loss of anonymity raises your security issues
considerably.").
73 See Justice Stephen Breyer, Interview Response, The Role ofthe Judiciary: Panel
Discussion with United States Supreme Court Justices, 25 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 71, 86
(2007) ("[Wle see men and women of every race, every religion, every point of view,
who have come into our court to resolve their differences ... [aInd we are trustees of
that institution. And none of us, I think, wants to do anything to harm that
institution."); Cameras in the Court, C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org/The-
Courts/Cameras-in-The-Court/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (Justice Kennedy
suggesting that "[w]e teach, by having no cameras, that we are different").
74 Mark Sherman, Associated Press, Scalia Loves His Gadgets, but Not Cameras in Court,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-scalia-loves-his-gadgets-but-not-
cameras-in-court-2010nov20-story.html (noting Scalia's opposition to cameras: "[I] n
the Court's heated cases about abortion, school prayer, gay rights and other high-
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the press "miseducates" the American public.7 5 His commentary
nearly always included a disparaging reference to media
"outtakes,"76 which he said would confuse the public about the
actual work of the Court, and he often chided the press for what
he said he could "guarantee" 7 7 would be sensationalized or
unrepresentative "man bites dog" coverage,7 rather than serious
journalism addressing the issues of the Court. Although his
commentary on cameras was primarily focused on the broadcast
media, it also conveyed distrust for print journalists who covered
the Court.7 9 He implied that the press would uniformly seek to
make the Court and its Justices "entertainment" rather than
profile topics, he said interest would be so great that broadcasters would take
snippets from the arguments and air them out of context.").
1 Constitutional Conversation (C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
Constitutional Conversation], http://www.c-span.org/video/? 186408-1/constitutional-
conversation ("I have come to the conclusion that it will misinform the public rather
than inform the public to have our proceedings televised."); Judicial Hearings, supra
note 61 ("[T]hey would, in effect, be given a misimpression of the Supreme Court. I
am very sure that that would be the consequence, and, therefore, I am not in favor of
televising."); Kalb Report, supra note 62 ("[W]hy should I participate in the
miseducation of the American people?"); Q&A with Justice Antonin, supra note 35 ("I
am against it because I do not believe, as the proponents of television in the court
assert, that the purpose of televising our hearings would be to educate the American
people. That's not what it would end up doing ... I am sure it will miseducate the
American people, not educate them.").
" Constitutional Conversation, supra note 75 ("But if you send it out on C-SPAN, what
will happen is, for every one person who sees it on C-SPAN gavel-to-gavel ...
10,000 will see 15-second takeouts on the network news, which I guarantee you will
be uncharacteristic of what the court does. So, I have come to the conclusion that it
will misinform the public rather than inform the public to have our proceedings
televised."); Harry A. Jessell, Scalia's Media Legacy: More Good Than Bad,
TVNEWSCHECK (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/92469/scalias-media-legacy-more-good-than-
bad ("What most of the American people would see would be 30-second, 15-second
take outs from our arguments and those take outs would not be characteristic of what
we do."); Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 35 ("You have to be sure, what
most of the American people would see would be 30-second, 15-second take-outs
from our argument and those take-outs would not be characteristic of what we do.
They would be uncharacteristic.").
7 Judicial Hearings, supra note 61 ("a 30-second outtake from one of the proceedings,
which I guarantee you would not be representative of what we do ... I am very sure
that would be the consequence .... ); Constitutional Conversation, supra note 75 (" 15-
second takeouts on the network news, which I guarantee you will be uncharacteristic
of what the court does.").
7 Constitutional Conversation, supra note 75 ("They want 'man bites dog' stories. They
don't want people to watch what the Supreme Court does over the course of a whole
hour of argument."); Kalb Report, supra note 62.
7 Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 35 (when asked whether the broadcast
snippets that he feared are merely the equivalent of newspaper quotations and
summaries from oral argument, Justice Scalia replied that readers might conclude
that "it's an article in the newspaper and the guy may be lying or he may be
misinformed").
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engaging in thoughtful news reporting." Thus, while the Court
that Justice Scalia joined in 1986 repeatedly characterized the
press as trustworthy-as a valuable educator of and proxy for the
citizens of the democracy " and as a particularly capable
conveyor of accurate information about the work of Courts82
Justice Scalia presupposed the opposite, that the media would
actively confuse and distort the goings-on of this branch of
government and that it would never serve the Fourth Estate
function if given the opportunity to record the proceedings of the
high Court.
The Justice expressed similar sentiments minimizing the
value of the press and emphasizing the inadequacies of media
coverage when he participated in interviews and question-and-
answer sessions, regularly opining that the press is biased, overly
simplistic, unfairly critical, untethered by any standards, and
unlikely to get things right, particularly as it pertains to the Court.
In one 2012 speech, for example, Scalia "expressed disdain for
the news media and the general reading public, and suggested
"oToday Show (CNBC television broadcast Oct. 10, 2005),
http://www.today.com/id/9649724/ns/today/t/justice-scalia-says-not-chance-
cameras/#.V3mNS7grLb0 (Justice Scalia, when asked whether cameras would be
allowed in the courtroom, replying, "Not a chance, because we don't want to become
entertainment. I think there's something sick about making entertainment about real
people's legal problems.").
s" See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (noting that "in a
society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations," describing the
" [gireat responsibility" of the "news media to report fully and accurately the
proceedings of government," and stating that "[w]ithout the information provided by
the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally");
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (footnote omitted) (calling press
freedom necessary "to supply the public need for information and education with
respect to the significant issues of the times").
82 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (citation
omitted) (calling the press critical to "public understanding of the rule of law and to
comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system" and
describing how it is a "surrogate[ ] for the public"); CoxBroad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 491-
92 (noting that "the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and
to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of
justice"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (stating that the
"responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration," noting that "[ilts function in this regard is documented by an
impressive record of service over several centuries," and describing how the press
"guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism").
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that together they condone inaccurate portrayals of federal
judges and courts."" He asserted:
"The press is never going to report judicial
opinions accurately[.]" . . . "They're just going to
report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice little
old lady? And who is the defendant? Was this, you
know, some scuzzy guy? And who won? Was it
the good guy that won or the bad guy? And that's
all you're going to get in a press report[.]" 8 4
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he made a
similarly sweeping denunciation, saying that "criticism in the
press" has "nothing to do with the law":
If they like the result, it is a wonderful opinion and
these are wonderful judges. And if they dislike the
result, it is a terrible opinion. They do not look to
see what the text of the statute is that was before
us and whether this result is indeed a reasonable
interpretation. None of that will appear in the
press reports, which will just tell you who the
plaintiff was, what the issue was, and who won."
Justice Scalia made clear that he was angry with-and felt
personally harmed by-the irresponsible press. When asked in a
CSPAN program what things made him "mad," he answered
that "the press ... if you read it ... gets under your skin," because
"effectively, they can say whatever they want.""6 He noted that
"one of the difficult things about the job . . . is that we are
criticized in the press for our opinions, but cannot respond to
press criticism."87 Although Justice Scalia did, in fact, respond
on a number of occasions to what he perceived as false or unfair
statements by the press about matters other than his judicial
opinions," he bemoaned the "disabilit[y] we operate under" that
83 John Heilprin, Scalia Sees Shift in Court's Role, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2006, at A19,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102200965.html.
8 4 d.
8 See Judicial Hearings, supra note 61, at 18.
8' Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 35.
8 S Id.
88 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) ("The
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precluded response to reporting about opinions themselves.8 9
"We get clobbered by the press all the time," he said.90 "I can't
tell you how many wonderful letters I've written to the
Washington Post just for my own satisfaction and then ripped up
and thrown away."91
Toward the end of his time on the Court, Justice Scalia
told a New York Magazine reporter in an interview that he had
long since cancelled his subscriptions to the Washington Post and
New York Times, because they were "slanted and often nasty" and
"so shrilly, shrilly liberal" that he "couldn't handle it
anymore." 92 When the reporter questioned whether his
consumption of only conservative media was an "isolating"
behavior, he pushed back at the accusation.9 3 But in another
portion of same interview, he lobbed a similar accusation at the
journalist, calling her "so out of touch with most of America"
and "so, so removed from mainstream America" when she
questioned some of his religious beliefs.9 4
All told, a blend of anger, cynicism, and sense of
victimization permeated nearly all of Justice Scalia's
implications of this argument are staggering. I must recuse because a significant
portion of the press ... demands it. The motion attaches as exhibits the press
editorials on which it relies. Many of them do not even have the facts right."); Peter
Lattman, Scalia's Gesture: Obscene or Not?, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (March 31, 2006
2:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/03/31/justice-scalias-gesture-obscene-or-
not-obscene/); ("[A] ... reporter asked [Scalia] whether his participation in the Mass
might cause some people to question his impartiality in matters of church and state.
In response, Scalia gave the reporter a hand-off-the-chin gesture. The Herald wrote a
story the next day characterizing Justice Scalia's gesture as obscene. Justice Scalia
responded ... explaining that the gesture was limited to 'fanning the fingers of my
right hand under my chin' meaning 'I couldn't care less.' He concluded. . . 'your
staff seems to have acquired the belief that any Sicilian gesture is obscene-especially
when made by an "Italian jurist."').
" Considering the Role ofJudges, supra note 61, at 18
90 Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 35.
91 Id.
92 Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
93 Id. ("Oh, c'mon, c'mon, c'mon! [Laughs.] Social intercourse is quite different from
those intellectual outlets I respect and those that I don't respect. I read newspapers
that I think are good newspapers, or if they're not good, at least they don't make me
angry, okay? That has nothing to do with social intercourse. That has to do with
'selection of intellectual fodder,' if you will.").
94 Id. ("You're looking at me as though I'm weird. My God! Are you so out of touch
with most of America, most of which believes in the Devil? I mean, Jesus Christ
believed in the Devil! It's in the Gospels! You travel in circles that are so, so removed
from mainstream America that you are appalled that anybody would believe in the
Devil! Most of mankind has believed in the Devil, for all of history. Many more
intelligent people than you or me have believed in the Devil.").
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commentary on and rhetoric about the press. He did not like the
press, did not trust the press, and did not convey that he found
any value in the work of the press. His persistent vocalization of
this Fourth Estate skepticism was in stark contrast to the Court's
previous, "almost uniformly affirmative characterization of the
press as a critically important, positively contributing social
entity that is worthy of protection and uniquely valuable[.]"9 5 His
contrary views may have shifted the Court more permanently in
profound ways.
III. FouRTH ESTATE SKEPTICISM IN DEBATES OVER THE PRESS
CLAUSE
These skeptical and accusatory characterizations of the
press also appeared in Justice Scalia's judicial opinions, which
were at times pointed in their commentary and were nearly
always unflattering in their depictions of the press. In time, they
became the characterization of the press adopted by the Court's
majority. Scalia's position-that the press does little societal
good and, as both a practical and an originalist matter, warrants
no special protection or even praise from the Court-was rare at
the beginning of his tenure, but by its conclusion, had infused
itself into the rhetoric of the Court's most prominent statements
on the press.
Justice Scalia believed the First Amendment's Press
Clause was a companion to the Speech Clause, with the latter
guaranteeing all speakers' right to speak and the former
guaranteeing all speakers' right to publish.9 6 The Press Clause
was not, the Justice emphasized, "referring to the institutional
press, the guys that run around with a fedora hat with a sticker
in it that says 'Press."'97 Rather than giving "any prerogatives to
the institutional press," it protects "anybody who has a Xerox
" Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 261.
96 Marvin Kalb, The Kalb Report: 45 Words, A Conversation with U S. Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the First Amendment, THE KALB
REPORT, 1, 7 (April 17, 2014) [hereinafter 45 Words, A Conversation with US. Supreme
Court Justices],
https://research.gwu.edu/sites/research.gwu.edu/files/downloads/45WordsTrans
cript.pdf (answering question about why the founding fathers added "of the press"
after "freedom of speech" by asserting that, "all it means is the freedom to speak or
to write.").
97 Id.
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machine."9 8 The Supreme Court's media law jurisprudence had
in fact been hesitant to afford special, affirmative rights to the
press, but the Court in the 1960s and 1970s had nevertheless
"recognized the press as constitutionally unique from nonpress
speakers"99 in cases dealing with distinctive press issues and,
especially, in dicta praising the media "as a democracy-
enhancing, power-checking, community-building institution
with a critical role to play in informing, educating, and
empowering a voting public.""oo Justice Scalia's strong view that
the First Amendment should protect the freedom to speak and to
publish without any special solicitude for the press as an entity"o'
was accompanied by a new brand of negative dicta that, by the
end of his time on the Court, had made its way from his separate
opinions into the opinions of the majority, substituting pro-press
rhetoric with rhetoric that was anti-press and, especially, anti-
press specialness.
Both Justice Scalia's insistence that the press is no
different from any speaker and his assertion that the press was
not to be celebrated or trusted had appeared in opinions he
authored as an appellate judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit before his
nomination to the United States Supreme Court. In cases directly
involving the press,102 but also in cases not centered on media
issues,10 3 he commented that the Press Clause was not designed
98 Id.
9 Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REv. 729, 731 (2014).
100 Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 261.
10145 Words, A Conversation with US. Supreme Court Justices, supra note 96 ("All it means
is the freedom to speak and to write . . . I don't know that there were any special rules
applicable to the press. The press did not have to get permission of a censor to publish.
But neither did anybody else . . . I have never thought that [the Press Clause] was
anything except identical [to the Speech Clause]. I can't imagine that you can limit
some things that can be spoken but cannot limit things that can be printed. I think it's
the same . . . .").
102 In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331 (1985) ("[T]he
First Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial
superior to that of the general public.") (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)).
103 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I start from the premise that when the Constitution said
'speech' it meant speech and not all forms of expression. Otherwise, it would have
been unnecessary to address 'freedom of the press' separately-or, for that matter,
'freedom of assembly,' which was obviously directed at facilitating expression. The
effect of the speech and press guarantees is to provide special protection against all
laws that impinge upon spoken or written communication . . . ").
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to create press-specific treatment under the First Amendment. In
Olman v. Evans,104 when a majority of the D.C. Circuit's en banc
panel held that allegedly defamatory statements set forth in a
syndicated column were protected expressions of opinion
entitled to absolute First Amendment protection, Scalia
dissented in part, emphasizing again that he believed any
additional protections for the press should be the result of
legislative action and not judicial declaration. 10 In the process of
doing so, he conveyed negative depictions of the press and its
work-describing the media's "intentional destruction of
reputation," 106 intimating that it had disproportionate power
over government decision makers, 107 and placing the phrase
"investigative reportage" in quotation marks, presumably to
signal a lack of confidence that the practice occurs. 108 He
colorfully empathized with those who "discern a distressing
tendency for our political commentary to descend from
discussion of public issues to destruction of private reputations,"
those who believe that the First Amendment is enhanced by
''putting some brake upon that tendency," and those who "view
high libel judgments as no more than an accurate reflection of
the vastly expanded damage that can be caused by media that are
capable of holding individuals up to public obloquy from coast
to coast and that reap financial rewards commensurate with that
power."109
This same tendency to judge the press as unlikely to make
positive societal contributions followed Scalia to the high court,
where he insisted that the press not be treated more favorably
than any other speaker and where his judicial opinions
repeatedly offered side jabs at the press in cases not directly
involving the media."o Justice Scalia was consistently opposed
104 750 F.2d 970, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1038.
106 Id. at 1038-39 (describing the problem of "the willfully false disparagement of
professional reputation in the context of political commentary").
107 Id. at 1039 ("It has not often been thought, by the way, that the press is among the
least effective of legislative lobbyists.").
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., City ofLittletonv. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 787 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The notion that media corporations have constitutional entitlement
to accelerated judicial review ofthe denial of zoning variances is absurd."); McConnell
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McIntyre v.
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to differential treatment of the press, whether positive or
negative."' So, for example, in Florida Star v. B.iF, when the
Court held that a newspaper that lawfully obtained a rape
victim's name from public police records could not be held liable
for invasion of privacy, Scalia wrote separately to note that the
spread of the news of her assault amongst her family and friends
would have harmed the victim as much, if not more, than the
publication of her name by a news outlet to people who did not
know her.112 Scalia objected to the imposition of a restriction
upon the press that did not also apply to individual speakers.1 13
In Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Pub. Corp.,114 Justice
Scalia again wrote separately to articulate his concern with a law
that distinguished the press from other speakers, this time to the
media's benefit. "' A publishing company challenged an
amendment to a California law that limited the release of
information about recent arrestees to those using it for certain
purposes, including journalistic purposes. "6 Addressing the
question of facial and as-applied challenges to the law, Scalia
emphasized that "a restriction upon access that allows access to
the press (which in effect makes the information part of the
public domain), but at the same time denies access to persons who
wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in
reality a restriction upon speech rather than upon access to
government information." 1 17
The pattern of insisting that the press not receive special
treatment was most prominent in the Court's campaign finance
cases, where Justice Scalia wrote separately to offer a
characterization of the press as "media corporations" with a bald
moneymaking agenda no different than that of any other
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 373 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But, of
course, if every partisan cry of 'freedom of the press' were accepted as valid, our
Constitution would be unrecognizable"); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
... See e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Los Angeles Police Dep't v.
United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
112 491 U.S. 524 at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113 Id. ("This law has every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to
impose upon the press but not upon itself.").
114 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
115 See id. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116 Id. (majority opinion).
117 Id. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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corporate speaker. The trajectory of these opinions can be traced
to their culmination in the majority opinion in Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission,"' where, for the first time, a majority
of the Court embraced not only Scalia's position on the
regulation of corporate speech in the campaign finance setting
but also the deep Fourth Estate skepticism that accompanied
it. 119
In 1990's Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,120 the
Court upheld, against First Amendment challenge, a provision
of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act that prohibited all
corporations except media corporations from using general
treasury funds for independent expenditures in connection with
state candidate elections. 121 Justice Scalia dissented. 122 He
pushed back against the majority's assertion that there is a
compelling state interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption in the political arena by reducing the
threat of amassed corporate wealth skewing political debate, and
he emphasized that he found this assertion inconsistent with the
majority's decision to uphold the exemption for media
corporations. 123 In the course of doing so, he countered the
longstanding narrative regarding "the unique role that the press
plays in 'informing and educating the public, offering criticism,
and providing a forum for discussion and debate,"' 124 and argued
that, under the majority's rationale, the press should actually be
seen as a particularly harmful entity that Michigan had an
especially strong reason to regulate. 125
Substituting the Fourth Estate depiction with a
characterization of the press as primarily or exclusively driven by
financial gain and bent on skewing public debate, 126 Justice
Scalia abandoned previous rhetoric about the press being likely
"1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
119 See id.
120 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
121 Id. at 657-66.
122 Id. at 690 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 3 Id. at 690-91.
124 Id. (internal citation omitted).
125 Id. at 691.
126 Id. ("But media corporations make money by making political commentary,
including endorsements. For them, unlike any other corporations, the whole world of
politics and ideology is fair game.").
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to act for the public good. Where the Court in the preceding years
had called the media "the 'eyes and ears' of the public,"12 7 had
assumed it would "report fully and accurately on the proceedings
of government,"1 28 and had credited it with being a "mighty
catalyst" in exposing citizens to competing viewpoints on civic
matters,12 9 Scalia spoke of the threat of "[a]massed corporate
wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary channels of
information," 130 the likelihood that media companies would
produce "too much of one point of view,"131 and his view that
the press had both "vastly greater power"1 32 and "vastly greater
opportunity"1 3 3 to "perpetrate the evil of overinforming. "134 As
he had done in the past, he stressed the non-specialness of the
press under the First Amendment: "We have consistently
rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any
constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." 1 35 To
Justice Scalia, this principle was not just one of Press Clause
doctrine; it was a new and diminished description of an entity
and its societal worth.
More than a decade later, in another campaign finance
case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 136 Justice Scalia
again pressed his position that limitations on campaign
contributions violate the First Amendment and again did so by
invoking media cases in ways that challenged the Fourth Estate
framework. Before Justice Scalia joined, the Supreme Court had
made clear that differential taxation of the press was
constitutionally problematic, 137 and its opinions in those tax
127 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
128 Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 492.
129 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
130 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 652, 691 (1990).
131 d
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (internal citation omitted) (Thus, the Court's holding on this point must be put
in the following discouraging form: "Although the press' unique societal role may
not entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitution . .. it does provide a
compelling reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the scope of
political expenditure limitations . . . One must hope, I suppose, that Michigan will
continue to provide this generous and voluntary exemption.").
136 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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cases contained some of the strongest statements of press
specialness and some of the strongest rhetoric about the value of
a free press in a democracy.13 8 Media scholars have recognized
that the tax cases are among the best examples of "ways in which
the press is historically and functionally unique" and "the
Constitution seeks to protect those differences."13 9 As Professor
Sonja West described, the "logic and language of the taxation of
the press cases reveals that the Court was recognizing that press
speakers function differently from individual speakers." 140
Indeed, the best reading of these cases is that the Court believed
the uniquely valuable contributions of a free press demand
uniquely careful protection from targeted tax schemes, which
"can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment
by the press [and undercut] the basic assumption of our political
system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on
government."1 4 1
Scalia's use of the selective press taxation cases in his
separate opinion in McConnell turned this characterization on its
head. He cited the major newspaper-taxation cases, not to
illustrate the distinct value of the press or the particularly
pressing need to protect it, but rather to suggest the opposite-
the identicalness of all "money used to fund speech."14 2 Justice
Scalia noted, as an originalist matter, that the founders
considered taxes on the press that were responses to unfavorable
coverage to be "grievous incursions on the freedom of the
press,"143 but his central thesis was not that the cases showed
rhetorical support for press specialness, but that "[t]hese press-
taxation cases belie the claim that regulation of money used to
138 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585 (stating that "the basic
assumption of our political system that the press will often serve as an important
restraint on government" and emphasizing that "'[a]n untrammeled press [is] a vital
source of public information' and an informed public is the essence of working
democracy") (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460
U.S. at 585 n.7 (noting that "the Framers perceived singling out the press for taxation
as a means of abridging the freedom of the press").
139 Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REv. 729, 736-37 (2014).140 Id. at 738.
141 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585. See also id. at 586 (referencing "the
censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press").
142 McConnellv. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "where the government singles out money used to fund speech as its
legislative object, it is acting against speech as such").14 31 d. at 253.
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fund speech is not regulation of speech itself."144 That the press
was involved in those cases was seemingly irrelevant to him.
After twenty years of insisting that the press plays no
special First Amendment role-and of replacing positive press
depictions with skeptical ones-Justice Scalia ultimately saw his
position embraced by a majority of the Court. In Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission,145 five members of the Court not
only adopted Justice Scalia's substantive position in the case,
holding that the First Amendment precludes the government
from limiting the independent political expenditures of
corporations and unions,14 but also, along the way, built a
negative characterization of the press on the foundation Scalia
had laid. Commentators recognized in the majority opinion a
new and "deep suspicion, even hostility, to the media's role as
the 'Fourth Estate"' that "gives cause for concern that future
decisions might erode the few 'special rights' the media currently
enjoy."14 Among "the extensive dicta in Citizens United
suggesting that a majority of the Justices on the Roberts Court
are deeply suspicious of the claim that the media play a special
constitutional role in our democracy,"1 48 much of the language
was Justice Scalia's. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and by Justices Scalia,
Alito, and Thomas,1 49 cited Justice Scalia's McConnell opinion
for its reference to the press taxation cases"' and cited his Austin
dissent for the proposition that newspapers are no different than
1" Id. at 253-54 (arguing that "restrictions on the expenditure of money for speech are
equivalent to restrictions on speech itself' and that " [i]f denying protection to paid-for
speech would shackle the First Amendment, so also does forbidding or limiting the
right to pay for speech") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
145 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
146 See id at 386.
147 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REv. 1819, 1832
(2012). For my earlier discussion of this hostility, see Jones, What the Supreme Court
Thinks, supra note 2.
148 Lidsky, supra note 147, at 1831-32.
149 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
150 Id. at 353 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 at 252-53
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297, U.S. 233,
245-48) (1936) (suggesting the First Amendment "was understood as a response to
the repression of speech and the press that had existed in England and the heavy
taxes on the press that were imposed in the colonies," but that it "was certainly not
understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society's most salient
media")).
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any other corporation"'-using Scalia's precise language from
Austin to "reject[ ] the proposition that the institutional press has
any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers."15 2
The Citizens United majority also echoed Justice Scalia's
earlier sentiments, both on and off the bench, about the press,
with an overall theme that "media corporations are elitist, wield
political power and influence disproportionate to their public
support, and are no more deserving of special protection than
any other corporation."15 3 The longstanding prevailing depiction
of the press as an entity that "plays a unique role not only in the
text, history, and structure of the First Amendment but also in
facilitating public discourse" 154 was, for the first time in the
modern media era, relegated to the dissenting position. It was
replaced by a majority view that the press is just another speaker
that "use[s] money amassed from the economic marketplace to
fund [its] speech.""' The majority repeatedly described the press
as primarily an "[a]ccumulator of wealth" and of "unreviewable
power."1"' Gone was any mention of the press as a surrogate for
the people, of the press's "impressive record of service over
several centuries" in "guard[ing] against the miscarriage of
justice,"157 or of the way "the press serves and was designed to
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power"15 -
replaced by strong suggestions that the press bears no meaningful
relationship to the citizenry and is itself likely to abuse its own
power. The Court characterized members of the media as
purveyors of a "24-hour news cycle" that is
"dominate[d]" by "sound bites, talking points,
and scripted messages," and as players in an
institution on the "decline"-amorphous and
i d at 352, 361 (citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
687, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).15 2 d at 352.
153 Lidsky, supra note 147, at 1833.
154 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 351.
151 Id. (asserting that there are "vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the
modern media empires[,]" and that "media corporations accumulate wealth with the
help of the corporate form [and] the largest media corporations have 'immense
aggregations of wealth"') (internal citations omitted).
157 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976) (quoting Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
151 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
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hard to peg because, given "the advent of the
Internet and the decline of print and broadcast
media,... the line between the media and others
who wish to comment on political and social
issues becomes far more blurred."15 9
The opinion implied that press coverage was "distorting"
to the political process, 160 and it characterized the press as
expressing "views [that] often 'have little or no correlation to the
public's support' for those views."'
Justice Scalia concurred separately in Citizens United to
reinforce both his originalist position on the First Amendment
and this sea change in press depiction.162 He drove home his now
firmly cemented position that the press is not a specific entity
with any constitutional otherness, but rather includes any
publisher, whether an individual, a printer, a newspaper, or other
corporate entity.16 3 He chastised the dissent's interpretation of
"the Freedom of the Press Clause to refer to the institutional
press," calling it "passing strange to interpret the phrase 'the
freedom of speech, or of the press' to mean, not everyone's right
to speak or publish, but rather everyone's right to speak or the
institutional press's right to publish."16 4 He praised the majority
for confirming the stance that he had long asserted, both
judicially and personally: that the decades of Fourth Estate
159 Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 261 (citing Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 364, 352) (internal citations omitted).
160 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 326.
161 Id. at 351 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990)).
162 See id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 Id at 390 ("Historical evidence relating to the textually similar clause 'the freedom
of... the press' also provides no support for the proposition that the First Amendment
excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from the scope of its protection. The
freedom of 'the press' was widely understood to protect the publishing activities of
individual editors and printers . . . But these individuals often acted through
newspapers, which (much like corporations) had their own names, outlived the
individuals who had founded them, could be bought and sold, were sometimes owned
by more than one person, and were operated for profit.").
164 Id, n.6 ("No one thought that is what it meant. Patriot Noah Webster's 1828
dictionary contains, under the word 'press,' the following entry: 'Liberty ofthe press, in
civil policy is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without
previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing
his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is
pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state.' As the Court's opinion describes,
our jurisprudence agrees with Noah Webster and contradicts the dissent.") (internal
citations omitted).
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rhetoric from the Court should no longer be the prevailing
characterization.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FOURTH ESTATE
SKEPTICISM
The about-face in characterization of the press during
Justice Scalia's three decades on the Court is worthy of a
discussion about its underlying causes and also a discussion
about its potential effects. As I have noted elsewhere,' both the
explanations for the shift and the possible ramifications of it are
complex and multifaceted. Scalia's push for a new, less positive
depiction of the press came at a time when the institutional press
experienced significant change and its reputation among the
American public plummeted-suggesting that Justice Scalia
(and, ultimately, his colleagues on the Court) were merely being
perceptive observers of the new media reality, "[m]apping [their]
views onto more widely held societal views that the press is no
longer valuable or laudable" and reflecting in their opinions the
growing consensus that "the modem-day press, in its day-to-day
operations, is not doing a good job of being press-like in the
constitutional sense." 166 But the reversal from positive to
skeptical depictions by the Court is noteworthy, no matter its
cause, both because of its likely impact on the institutional press
and because of the potential that it will impact wider First
Amendment rights.
Working journalists in America will surely find this
diminished characterization distressing, because the Court's
positive rhetoric about the press in the past appears to have been
key to positive outcomes in cases involving the press. 167 "A
negative Supreme Court characterization of the press thus might
be expected to have a correspondingly negative effect on the
operation of the journalistic enterprise and, concomitantly, on
the many Americans who consume that journalistic work
product." 6 '
165 See Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2.
.
66 Id. at 266.
167 See id.
168 Id.
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More broadly, the new Fourth Estate skepticism in the
Court's writings about the press is cause for concern because the
victories that the press garnered during the pre-Scalia era of
positive portrayals were not victories enjoyed by the press alone,
but instead expanded the First Amendment rights of all citizens.
As I investigate in more detail elsewhere, "[a] sizable amount of
vital constitutional doctrine in this country developed as a result
of constitutional cases in which mainstream media companies,
often newspapers, aggressively fought for fundamental
democratic principles that had public benefits beyond the scope
of the individual [press] litigants' successes."16 9 It is primarily,
and sometimes exclusively, because of cases argued before the
high court by the positively characterized press that the wider
citizenry enjoys a First Amendment right to observe trials and
other government proceedings, to access public documents, to be
free from prior restraints, and to speak openly about matters of
public concern.170
Justice Scalia's personal and jurisprudential statements
devaluing the press, recharacterizing it as something less than a
Fourth Estate, appear to have held sway with a majority of his
colleagues by the end of his time on the Court. Among the
questions that should be asked as we reflect on his legacy is
whether that negative characterization might have lasting effects
that are detrimental to the nation as a whole.
169 RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-
Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 557, 571 (2011).
170 Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 2, at 269-71.
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